The distinction that matters most here is whether giving is a duty with a figure attached or a virtue left to conscience, and traditions divide on it sharply.
Zakat is the clearest case of the first. It is a fixed proportion of accumulated wealth above a threshold, owed annually, with the categories of recipient named in scripture, and in several countries it is collected by the state. It is not charity in the ordinary sense: the framing is that the poor hold a right in the wealth of the rich, so paying discharges an obligation rather than earning credit for generosity.
Tzedakah carries the same logic in its name, which means righteousness and not love or pity. Rabbinic law sets a customary level of a tenth of income, treats the obligation as enforceable in principle, and Maimonides ranked the ways of giving in eight degrees: the highest is a loan, a partnership or a job that ends the need for charity altogether, and the lowest is a grudging gift handed over unwillingly. Anonymity ranks high on both sides of the transaction, with neither party knowing the other.
Christian teaching has generally kept giving as a virtue rather than a tariff. The tithe survives as a strong convention and in some churches as an expectation, but the emphasis falls persistently on the disposition of the giver rather than the sum.
Dana in Buddhism is framed differently again. It is the first of the perfections and the foundation of lay practice, and the monastic order depends on it materially, monks in the Theravada countries still walk for alms each morning and may not cook or store food. But its stated function is to erode the giver's attachment, and the merit generated is held to depend on the state of mind in giving. That makes it psychological in a way the Abrahamic versions are not, and the recipient's need is not the measure of the act.