The question the main entry raises but does not resolve, whether avidya belongs to the individual self or to Brahman, became the point of division between the two major interpretive schools of later Advaita, the Vivarana and Bhamati traditions, named for their foundational commentaries on Shankara's work.
The Bhamati school, following Vachaspati Mishra's tenth-century commentary, held that avidya has its locus in the individual self (jiva), since it is the individual, not Brahman, who experiences bondage; on this reading each jiva carries its own avidya, and Brahman is the object the ignorance obscures rather than the site where it resides, a position that preserves Brahman's purity but faces the difficulty of explaining how the jiva, itself a product of avidya, can be avidya's locus without circularity. The Vivarana school, following Prakashatman's commentary, held instead that avidya has its locus in Brahman itself, since only Brahman, as the one real consciousness, is available to serve as a substrate for anything, with the jiva understood as a product of Brahman conditioned by this Brahman-based ignorance rather than a pre-existing bearer of its own.
Each position generated difficulties: the Bhamati view struggled to explain the origin of individual selves prior to any ignorance-generated individuality, while the Vivarana view drew the objection that locating ignorance in Brahman risks compromising the purity Advaita is committed to as Brahman's defining nature. Later manuals typically present both without adjudicating, treating the dispute as evidence that Advaita's founding insight was compatible with more than one account of the mechanics behind it.