The Buddha's statement in the Salayatana Samyutta that "the all" consists in just the six sense bases, and that anyone positing an "all" beyond them could not explain what they meant, is a striking restriction of the field of legitimate inquiry that invites comparison with Western empiricism, which developed a structurally similar restriction for its own reasons centuries later.
John Locke's account of knowledge, in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), held the mind begins as a blank slate and that all its content derives from sensory experience, so any claimed knowledge not traceable to an experiential origin is suspect, a restriction resembling the Buddhist insistence that the six sense bases exhaust the field within which anything meaningful can be discussed. Later empiricists, particularly the logical positivists with their verification principle, went further, holding a statement is meaningful only if it can be verified through sense experience, a criterion used, like the Buddhist passage, to rule certain metaphysical claims out as unintelligible rather than merely false.
The comparison should not be pushed too far: Western empiricism developed this restriction to settle questions about scientific knowledge, while the Buddhist restriction serves a soteriological purpose, redirecting attention from speculative questions the texts present the Buddha as declining to answer not because they are meaningless but because engaging them does not conduce to liberation, a difference in motivation beneath a genuine similarity in the restrictive move.