Theistic personalism's philosophical case, as Richard Swinburne and others in the analytic tradition have developed it, starts from the intuition that the highest conceivable perfection includes personal attributes, knowledge, will, love, moral goodness, rather than excluding them in favor of a more abstract, impersonal absolute; an unconscious, impersonal ultimate reality, however metaphysically grand, lacks precisely the capacities, to know, to choose, to love, that seem to constitute the highest kind of being anyone has ever actually encountered, so a maximally perfect being, on this reasoning, should be understood as supremely personal rather than as beyond or beneath personality altogether. This is deliberately set against classical theism's more apophatic tendencies, in which divine simplicity and transcendence are pushed hard enough that even calling God a person, in any sense closely analogous to human personhood, becomes theologically fraught, some classical theologians insisting God is beyond the category of person as much as beyond any other finite category; theistic personalists argue this apophatic caution, taken too far, risks making God's personal relationship with creatures, prayer, covenant, incarnation, unintelligible, since a being beyond all personal categories cannot coherently be described as hearing a prayer or loving a creature in any sense continuous with ordinary personal relationship.
The position's own technical difficulty is squaring full personhood, which seems to involve responding to new situations and therefore changing in some respect, with classical divine attributes like immutability and impassibility, a tension different theistic personalist theologians resolve differently, some qualifying immutability, others qualifying just how literally personal language about God should be taken.