Rigpa is the Tibetan term for intrinsic awareness, the knowing quality of mind that Dzogchen identifies as mind's own nature. It translates the Sanskrit vidya, knowledge, and stands opposite marigpa, which renders avidya, ignorance. The pairing is exact and deliberate: rigpa is not a special state added to an ordinary mind but the absence of the fundamental non-recognition that constitutes ignorance in the first place.
Dzogchen texts distinguish rigpa carefully from ordinary mind (sems), the stream of thoughts, emotions and perceptions. The distinction is not that rigpa is a different thing concealed behind the stream, but that it is the aware nature within which the stream occurs and which the stream ordinarily obscures by capturing attention. The standard images are the sky within which clouds form and disperse without staining it, and a mirror unaffected by whatever it reflects. The tradition insists that this is a distinction to be recognised in experience rather than a metaphysical thesis to be accepted, which is why the transmission proceeds by pointing-out instruction from a qualified teacher and not by argument.
Rigpa is described as having three inseparable aspects: essence, which is empty; nature, which is luminous or cognisant; and energy or compassion, which is unobstructed and all-pervading. That emptiness is placed first is doctrinally load-bearing. It is the tradition's answer to the objection that an intrinsic, self-existing awareness would be exactly the permanent self Buddhism denies, and Dzogchen writers reply that rigpa is not a thing, not an entity, not locatable and not findable when looked for, and that calling it luminous does not make it a substance.
The term has entered Western usage widely through translations and popular presentations. Tibetan teachers have repeatedly cautioned that reading about rigpa is not recognising it, and that attempting recognition without the preliminary practices, ethical training and relationship to a teacher that the tradition prescribes tends to produce a conceptual imitation, an error the classical texts themselves name and warn against at considerable length, which suggests it is not a modern problem only.