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Sacred Correspondences
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School of Names

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Origin 320 BCE to 250 BCE

The School of Names (Mingjia) is the retrospective label for a loose group of Warring States disputers, bian zhe, chiefly Hui Shi (Wade-Giles: Hui Shih, active around 313 BCE) and Gongsun Long (Wade-Giles: Kung-sun Lung, circa 320 to 250 BCE), known for argument aimed at clarifying the relation between names (ming) and the actual things they denote. Gongsun Long is remembered above all for the claim that a white horse is not a horse, using the difference between a name that picks out color and shape together and a name that picks out shape alone to argue the two do not share a single reference. Hui Shi survives mainly through ten paradoxes the Zhuangzi preserves, including the claim that the sun at noon is simultaneously declining, arguing that distinctions are relative to a perspective rather than fixed in the world. Modern scholarship often treats the disputers alongside the later Mohists, since passages in the Mohist Canons rebut or defend against their arguments directly. Almost none of the school's own writing survives complete.

Facts
Origins
Origin Period
320 BCE to 250 BCE 1
Origin Period
Warring States period, fourth to third century BCE. 1
Place of Origin
China, Warring States courts 1
Founder
No single founder; associated chiefly with Hui Shi (Wade-Giles: Hui Shih) and Gongsun Long (Wade-Giles: Kung-sun Lung) 1
Attributions
Tradition
Independent; associated with disputation and early Chinese logic 1
Status
Standing as a Comparative Category
A standard analytic category in the study of religion 1
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Hard, White and the Discourse That Divided a Single Stone Into Two Objects

Gongsun Long's other surviving argument is less famous than the white horse but structurally similar, and turns on a single hard white stone. Touch the stone and you perceive its hardness but not its color; look at it and you perceive its whiteness but not its hardness, since no sense organ delivers both properties at once. From this Gongsun Long argued that hardness and whiteness, though both real properties of the one stone, are never actually given together in any single act of perception, and pressed the question of what it even means to say a hard white stone is a single, unified object rather than two properties merely co reported by two different senses about the same location.

Contemporaries and later readers split over whether this was a serious metaphysical claim about how properties relate to the objects that bear them or a display of clever argument for its own sake, the same charge of sophistry leveled against the white horse argument, and the later Mohist Canons took the dispute seriously enough to answer it directly, arguing that hardness and whiteness do occupy one and the same stone whether or not any single perception ever registers both together, treating the question as one about the structure of reality rather than the limits of a given sense. The disagreement is one of the clearest surviving instances of one Warring States school reading another's argument closely enough to construct a formal rebuttal, evidence that the disputers' reputation for argument for its own sake did not stop rival schools from taking their conclusions as claims that needed answering.

The Paradoxes That Made a School of Names

The School of Names has no founding teacher and no single text of doctrine, unlike Confucianism with Confucius or Mohism with Mozi. Later bibliographers grouped as Mingjia a set of disputers, bian zhe, who earned reputations one paradox at a time, in debate conducted for its own sake as much as for any conclusion.

Hui Shi, active around 313 BCE, is known almost entirely through ten propositions the Zhuangzi preserves without fully explaining. Among them: the sun at noon is simultaneously declining, a thing dies at the moment it is born, and the greatest thing has nothing outside it while the smallest has nothing inside it. Read together they push at the boundary between how words carve the world into fixed categories and how the world is continuous and changing, an argument later readers connect to Zhuangzi's own skepticism about fixed perspectives.

Gongsun Long, active from about 320 to 250 BCE, built tightly reasoned arguments rather than gnomic sayings. His most famous claim, that a white horse is not a horse, turns on the difference between a name picking out color and shape together, white horse, and a name picking out shape alone, horse. Taken as classes rather than objects, the two names do not share one reference, so the statement that a white horse is a horse conflates two distinct claims. The argument struck contemporaries as sophistry, but it is among the earliest sustained Chinese reasoning about language and reality, and scholarship reads it alongside the later Mohist Canons, whose passages rebut or defend against disputer arguments.

Almost none of the school's own writing survived. The Gongsun Longzi is the only text to come down complete, and the paradoxes attributed to Hui Shi exist only because a rival tradition thought them worth quoting.

Cross-Tradition Connections

Associated With

The Mohist Dialectics/Canons contain passages that rebut or defend against School of Names arguments directly; modern scholarship often treats the two together.

Sources
1. School of Names (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry)
Chris Fraser, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2005View the Source
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