Organised dhikr has been contested within Islam for as long as it has existed, and the argument concerns form rather than remembrance itself, which the Quran commands and nobody disputes.
The objections have been consistent across centuries. That collective rhythmic recitation with movement and music is an innovation with no basis in the practice of the earliest community. That it resembles the practices of other religions rather too closely. That the states it induces are physiological and are mistaken for spiritual attainment. That attachment to a living teacher who assigns litanies verges on placing an intermediary between the believer and God. Ibn Taymiyya made versions of most of these in the fourteenth century, and modern Salafi teaching reproduces them, generally accepting individual remembrance while rejecting the organised collective form.
The defence is equally old: that the Quran commands abundant remembrance without prescribing a manner, that the earliest generations gathered to recite together, and that the effect on the practitioner over years is itself the evidence.
What altered the balance was state power. The Ottoman lodges were closed by law in 1925 and that law has never been repealed. Saudi Arabia, formed around the reformist theology, suppressed the orders and the shrine culture attached to them. Soviet and later Chinese authorities suppressed Sufi organisations in Central Asia and Xinjiang. In each case the practice continued privately, and in several it has re-emerged. Across West Africa, Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, the Balkans, South Asia and Indonesia the orders remain very large, and in a number of countries they are the dominant form of Islamic religious life rather than a mystical fringe attached to it, a fact that general accounts of Islam still routinely understate.